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Abstract
Using an extensive data set on foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) in
the Chinese mainland, we compare the sensitivities of the location choice
of foreign direct investment (FDI) from six major source countries/areas
(Hong Kong, Taiwan, US, EU, Japan and Korea) toward the variation in
the strength of economic institutions across Chinas regions. It is found that
FIEs from the source countries/areas that are culturally more remote from
China often exhibit a stronger aversion to regions with weaker economic in-
stitutions. Moreover, this pattern is often more salient when FDI takes the
form of fully-owned enterprises (FOEs) than when it takes the form of joint
ventures (JVs).
1From the Chinese University of Hong Kong, University of Hong Kong and Univesity
of Hong Kong respectively.
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1 Introduction
As a central part of the globalization process, foreign direct investment (FDI)
has substantially changed the landscape of the world economy in the past few
decades. Attracting FDI inow is placed at the top of the agenda for most
countries. What determines where FDI goes has long remained an intriguing
question to academics and policy-makers. There is still much debate about
what factors and policies most inuence the location decision of multina-
tional enterprises (MNEs) in the global marketplace. The conventional view
puts much emphasis on the impacts of agglomeration economies, market
size, taxes, trade policies, exchange rate and interest rate policies, produc-
tion costs, infrastructure adequacy, etc. on FDI locational choices. Recently,
more attention has been paid to the economic institutions of the FDI re-
cipient countries. Economic institutions refer to the various dimensions of
institutions that ensure the smooth operation of a market economy such as
contract enforcement, property rights protection, government e¢ ciency and
government intervention in business operations.
This paper investigates the importance of economic institutions in addi-
tion to the more conventional factors like agglomeration economies, produc-
tion costs and infrastructure as determinants of FDI locational choices. In
particular, we explore how the cultural proximity between FDI source coun-
tries and the Chinese mainland shapes the locational choices of MNEs in
di¤erent regions in China with varying institutional quality. In other words,
we address the issue of whether FDI from di¤erent source countries/areas ex-
hibits di¤erent sensitivities to the economic institutions of host regions based
on the degree of di¤erence in culture between home and host countries.
The decision of a foreign-invested enterprise (FIE) to enter a foreign mar-
ket depends crucially on its knowledge and experience with the local market.
FIEs typically give priority to the markets perceived to be psychologically
close. It is argued that psychically close countries can reduce uncertainty
over investment prospects and facilitate learning about the target countries
(Johnson and Vahlne, 1977, 1990; Kogut and Singh, 1988). However, the
psychic distance in turn depends on the proximity in culture between the
FDI source country and host country.
Cultural proximity can play an important role in a¤ecting the adapt-
ability of FIEs to local institutions in the host country. FIEs from coun-
tries/areas that are culturally close to the host country may nd it easier
to learn to adapt to the di¤erent institutions in the host country. In other
words, cultural proximity can alleviate the negative impact of institutional
di¤erences on FDI entry. For instance, FIEs from Hong Kong and Taiwan
encounter a completely di¤erent institutional environment when they enter
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the Chinese mainland. But the sharing of the same language and cultural
heritage enable FIEs from these two areas to learn quickly how to build up
connections with the mainland bureaucrats. Thus, in our opinion, FIEs from
home countries/areas that are culturally proximate to the host country may
nd it easier to adapt to the local markets, institutions and business envi-
ronment. Then they will be less sensitive to local economic institutions when
they make decisions on FDI location.
We investigate this issue by looking at FDI in China. In recent years,
China has emerged as one of the largest FDI recipient countries in the world.
FDI is widely agreed to be one primary engine for Chinas economic growth.
World Bank (1997) credited FDI as a main driving force behind Chinas eco-
nomic miracle. At the same time, China is a vast country with substantial
regional disparity in economic institutions as well as infrastructure, produc-
tion costs, human capital endowments and industry agglomeration. This rich
variation across regions makes China an ideal setting to study the impact of
economic institutions on FDI locational choices.
China is also a country whose inward FDI comes from a rich variety of
sources. Based on the FDI value, Hong Kong, Taiwan, US, European Union
(EU), Japan and Korea are the major source countries or areas. They ex-
hibit a wide variation in cultural distances to mainland China. For instance,
EU and US are very remote from China in culture, whereas Hong Kong and
Taiwan are ethically Chinese economies that share the same culture with
the mainland. This rich variety of FDI sources makes China an ideal set-
ting to examine how the cultural distances between the source and recipient
countries shape the FDI locational choices.
We are particularly interested in whether cultural similarities or dissim-
ilarities between the FDI source countries/areas and China a¤ect the sen-
sitivity of FDI ows to the economic institutions of di¤erent regions in the
Chinese mainland.
When we look at FDI in China, one striking feature emerges: FDI exhibits
a highly uneven distribution across regions with the east coast taking the
lions share. What determines this spatial distribution pattern of FDI in
China? Are the conventional factors such as infrastructure adequacy, human
capital endowment, and industry agglomeration able to account fully for the
pattern?
Using an extensive rm-level dataset on FIEs in China, we employ dis-
crete choice model developed by McFadden (1974) to examine the factors
determining the locational choices of FDI from Hong Kong, Taiwan, US,
EU, Japan and Korea. Our empirical analysis shows that FIEs from source
countries that are more remote culturally from the Chinese mainland often
exhibit a higher degree of sensitivity toward regional economic institutions
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in their choice of FDI location.
We further investigate the impact of regional economic institutions on the
location choices of joint ventures (JVs) and fully owned enterprises (FOEs),
i.e., the subsidiaries of MNEs. In terms of entry modes, FDI can take var-
ious forms. In our dataset, we nd that FIEs typically set up a JV with a
local partner rm or establish an FOE from scratch. We expect that regional
economic institutions would exhibit di¤erent patterns in inuencing FDI lo-
cation choice for FIEs that enter China in the form of JVs or FOEs. It is
likely that local partners in JVs can help deal with local governments and
overcome the barriers posed by the inadequacy of local economic institutions
so as to smooth business operations, while FOEs have to cope with local gov-
ernments on their own. Therefore, we expect that FOEs are more sensitive to
regional economic institutions than do JVs in their location choice. Depend-
ing on whether FIEs come from culturally close or distant countries/areas,
we expect that JVs and FOEs from di¤erent sources exhibit di¤erent sensi-
tivities to the variation in regional economic institutions in location choice.
More specically, if FOEs are more sensitive to regional institutions than do
JVs, this di¤erentiation will be more salient for FDI coming from more cul-
turally distant source countries/areas. In the empirical analysis, we do nd
that both FOEs and JVs exhibit stronger responses to regional economic in-
stitutions in location choice when the cultural disparity between the source
and host countries/areas are larger, and comparatively the sensitivities of
FOEs are stronger than those of JVs.
As the largest FDI recipient country, China has recently caught much
attention in the academic literature on FDI locational choice. For instance,
Head and Ries (1996), Cheng and Kwan (2000), He (2002), Chang and Park
(2005), and Amiti and Javorcki (2005) address the e¤ects of agglomeration
on FDI location determination in China. Belderbos and Carree (2001), Fung,
Iizaka and Parker (2002), Zhou, Delios and Yang (2002), and Fung, Iizaka
and Siu (2003) examine a host of FDI location determinants, but they did
not touch upon the roles of agglomeration and institutions. Limited by the
unavailability of rm-level FIE data, most of these studies only include city-
level, region-level or industry-level data. 2
The studies of the impact of institutions on FDI ows have grown quickly.3
2As an exception, Chang and Park (2005) employ the rm-level data to examine the
determinants of FDI location choice of Korean rms in China. However, they mainly focus
on the role of agglomeration e¤ects without considering regional institution strength.
3In recent years, various cross-country and within-country studies such as, among oth-
ers, Besley (1995), Knack and Keefer (1995, 1997), Mauro (1995), Hall and Jones (1999),
La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1999), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robin-
son (2001, 2002) (See Pande and Udry (2005) for a brief review) have produced largely
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In a cross-country study using aggregate data, Wei (2000a, 2000b) nds that
corruption in a host country substantially deters inward FDI. More recently,
Campos and Kinoshita (2003), Anghel (2005), Benassy-Quere, Coupet and
Mayer (2005), Trevino (2005), and Hyun (2006) use aggregate FDI data to
conduct cross-country studies to examine the impact of institutions on FDI
ows. Du, Lu and Tao (2008) is the rst study that examines the impact of
economic institutions on FDI location choice in China. It employs the rm-
level data to investigate how the variation in regional economic institutions
shapes the location choices of US multinationals in di¤erent regions in China.
This study contributes to the literature in several aspects. First, our
study provides a new perspective on the interrelationship between economic
institutions and FDI ows. We demonstrate that the impact of economic
institutions on FDI locational choice varies signicantly with the cultural
distance between the host and source countries/areas. To the best of our
knowledge, our paper is the rst one that systematically examines how cul-
tural distance a¤ects the sensitivity of FIEs toward local institutions.
Second, our single country study is more powerful in capturing the vari-
ation in de facto institutional strength than do cross-country studies. As a
matter of fact, cross-country studies are likely to confound numerous factors.
In contrast, our single-country analysis allows us to hold constant many as-
pects such as political system, legal tradition, de jure legal codes, culture and
language, national tax policies, exchange rates, and trade policies that could
vary dramatically across countries. This helps us single out the aspects of
institutional quality that are most closely related to the e¤ectiveness of law
enforcement and the e¢ ciency of economic institutions.
Third, as far as we know, ours is the rst study that examines how the
interplay of economic institutions and cultural distances a¤ects FDI loca-
tional choice by using rm-level data. In so doing, we can virtually minimize
the concern for endogeneity (including reverse causality) issue in econometric
analysis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data
and variables. Section 3 lays out the empirical estimation strategy. Results
are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
consistent results that a high quality of economic institutions contributes to a good eco-
nomic performance. This provides the general background for the study of the impact of
economic institutions on FDI ows.
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2 Data and Variables
2.1 Data
Our data comes from a broad dataset of FIEs in China compiled byChina Na-
tional Bureau of Statistics. This extensive dataset on FIEs contains 150,602
FIEs in 2001, accounting for 74.44% of the total 202,306 FIEs in China as
reported by China Statistical Yearbook 2002. Among them, our dataset has
141,668 enterprises engaged in the manufacturing sector, covering 75.45% of
the total number of foreign manufacturing enterprises in China in 2001.
Our study focuses on FIEs from Hong Kong, Taiwan, US, EU, Japan
and Korea. We focus on the period 1993-2001 because the data on many
of the independent variables in regression analysis are not available in the
years before 1993 and the FDI ow into China has increased dramatically
only since 1992. After deleting those FIEs without registration dates and
involving individual foreign investors and after restricting ourselves to the
FIEs engaged in the manufacturing sector, we are left with 20,851 rms from
Hong Kong, 3,097 rms from Taiwan, 4,445 rms from the US, 2,440 FIEs
from the EU, 3,953 FIEs from Japan, and 1,786 rms from Korea. Though
our dataset covers only one year (2001), we follow the common practice in
the literature by using the year in which an FIE is registered as the year of
its entry. This enables us to identify the entry year of all FIEs.
2.2 Variables
2.2.1 Regional Institutions in China
Regional institutions mainly refer to the state of contract enforcement, gov-
ernment intervention in business operations, property rights protection and
bureaucratic corruption in a region. Regions with weak economic institu-
tions are typically characterized by weak contract enforcement, heavy govern-
ment intervention in business operations, inadequate protection of property
rights and severe corruption, which may increase the expropriation risks to
FIEs. China is a unitary state with uniform de jure laws across the country.
However, law enforcement may exhibit a wide variation across regions, i.e.,
provinces or province-level cities. In this sense, examining the variation in
economic institutions across regions in China allows us to conduct a natural
experiment to focus on the de facto law enforcement after holding constant
the de jure legal codes. This certainly o¤ers a better setting to distinguish
between legal codes and law enforcement than does the cross-country analy-
sis.
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Contract Enforcement
Contract enforcement hinges on legal institutions and law enforcement.
While China has had commercial laws on paper since the early stage of its
economic reforms, the quality of legal institutions and the degree of law
enforcement, however, vary signicantly across regions. A comprehensive
indicator of the e¤ectiveness of contract enforcement is the willingness to
use courts in resolving business disputes. From the Survey of Chinas Pri-
vate Enterprises, we construct a measure of Contract Enforcement in Chinas
various regions. It is the proportion of private entrepreneurs answering af-
rmatively to the question: will you use courts to resolve business disputes?
This index also exhibits a large variation across regions. For instance, some
neighboring regions in North China, i.e., Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei and Shanxi,
exhibit a large variation in the value of this index, having 0.24, 0.17, 0.22
and 0.10 respectively.
Intellectual Property Rights Protection
Unlike some of the other transition economies, China did not have formal
protection of private properties until fairly recently. However, various reg-
ulations and rules help maintain a reasonable level of protection for private
properties, and the level of protection di¤ers from one region to another.
Thus, our measure of property rights protection intensively reects the de
facto property rights protection across Chinas regions. We use the protec-
tion of intellectual properties to measure property rights protection. This is
ideal not only because we can rely on the quantiable patent data in gauging
intellectual property rights protection but also because it reects the cen-
tral concern of FIEs from advanced economies. For instance, multinationals
from the United States and the EU are typically large companies equipped
with modern technologies. This is consistent with the importance of intellec-
tual property in achieving economic growth in those economies. According
to Israel (2006), industries with signicant intellectual properties account for
over half of all U.S. exports; intellectual property accounts for over 1/3 of the
value of all U.S. corporations, and represents 40% of U.S. economic growth.
Similarly, in service/knowledge-based economies of the EU, protecting intel-
lectual property rights (IPR) is considered essential by many businesses in
their pursuit of innovation and competitiveness. According to the Technol-
ogy Review Patent Scoreboard 2004, Philips and Ericsson led over 1,400
and 650 patents respectively worldwide in 2003. It is thus not surprising
that FIEs from advanced economies such as the United States and the EU
are particularly concerned with intellectual property rights protection.
In recent years, the rising tide of counterfeiting and piracy in China has
7
posed an enormous threat to foreign business interests. For example, in a
2005 survey of the U.S.-China Business Council, members put enforcement
of IPR protection at the very top on their list of concerns. The serious in-
tellectual property infringement in China reects the lack of proactive and
deterrent intellectual property enforcement, especially at the local level (Is-
rael, 2006; Stratford, 2006). Depending on the di¤erence in government
coordination capacity, corruption, sta¤ training and legal enforcement power
across regions, the degree of IPR protection also exhibits a large variation
from region to region.
We use the logarithm of the number of approved patents per capita (avail-
able from China Statistical Yearbook, various issues) as a measure of IPR
protection. Though patent number could be an outcome of research and de-
velopment capacity and inputs, human capital endowment and other factors
in various regions, property rights protection provided by regional govern-
ments no doubt plays an instrumental role. For example, Guangdong has
a lower level of education achievements in terms of both the proportion of
people enrolled in higher education institutions and that having higher ed-
ucation degrees than many other provinces such as Jilin and Heilongjiang,
but the number of patents per capita in Guangdong is much higher than
that in these two Northeastern regions. To further relieve the potential con-
cern about whether the number of patents per capita mainly reects regional
human capital endowments, we control for the education level in various re-
gions in China in our regression analysis. IPR protection varies substantially
across the country. Beijing has the highest number of patents per capita, fol-
lowed by Shanghai and Guangdong, whereas Gansu has the lowest number
of patents per capita and followed by Guizhou and Qinghai.
Government Intervention in Business Operations
The second variable for property rights protection concerns the degree of
Government Intervention in Business Operations, constructed based on data
from the Survey of Chinas Private Enterprises 1995-2002.4 In the survey,
there is a question about whether private entrepreneurs would go and ask
for government help when they encounter business disputes, and the variable
Government Intervention in Business Operations is dened as the proportion
of entrepreneurs requesting government help in case of business disputes.
This index exhibits a wide variation across regions. For example, in terms
of level of economic development, the six regions of Beijing, Guangdong,
4This survey was conduced by the United Front Work Department of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China, the All China Industry and Commerce
Federation, and the China Society of Private Economy at the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, in 1995, 1997, 2000, and 2002.
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Jiangsu, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Zhejiang are at a similar level, but they
di¤er substantially in terms of government intervention. Beijing, Jiangsu,
Tianjin and Zhejiang have a score of about 0.10 and 0.11, Shanghai has a
value of 0.07, whereas Guangdong has 0.05 that is only about half of that for
Beijing etc.
Government intervention in business operations could be indicative of
either strong or weak protection of private properties. On the one hand,
government help may ll the void created by the lack or weakness of the
court system. That is to say, government intervention is a second-best solu-
tion to the lack of formal protection of private properties. If this is the case,
FIEs may nd government help in business operations an appealing feature
of Chinas regional governments. On the other hand, government help may
lead to rent-seeking and even corruption: entrepreneurs lobby or bribe gov-
ernment o¢ cials to seek favor in resolving business disputes. This becomes
the grabbing hand of the government (Frye and Shleifer 1997; Shleifer and
Vishny, 1999).
Drawing insights from the recent studies on market-preserving federalism
and regional decentralization in Chinas economic reforms (Blanchard and
Shleifer, 2001; Roland, Qian, and Xu, 2006; Clarke, Murrell, and Whiting,
2008), we believe that government helping hand is likely to exist. Although
the Chinese government system is characterized by substantial devolution
of administrative power from the central government to regional adminis-
trations that prominently features scal federalism or scal decentralization,
the central government retains the political power to appoint, promote or
sack regional government o¢ cials. O¢ cials in regions with better economic
performance are more likely to be promoted. This regional decentralization
under the control of the central government is most likely to generate regional
competition for economic growth in a variety of ways, including helping pri-
vate entrepreneurs to resolve business disputes.
Arguably, whether government intervention ends up as a grabbing hand
or a helping hand could hinge crucially on the cultural background of entre-
preneurs. FIEs with a large disparity in culture with China are more likely
to view government intervention as a grabbing hand rather than a helping
hand because the distance in culture could deter FIEs from e¤ectively com-
municating with local bureaucrats and prompt FIEs to suspect the intention
of local o¢ cials in getting involved in private businesses. Hence, we expect to
see cultural distance to be important in shaping the impacts of government
intervention on FDI entry.
Government Corruption
Chinas economic reform has been accompanied by the rampant corrup-
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tion over the past three decades. The extensive state control of and state
intervention in the national economy, the lack of democracy and freedom of
media, the weak rule of law, etc. have contributed to the severe corruption
problem. Government corruption, however, varies across Chinas regions,
which provides us an opportunity to test the impacts of the severity of gov-
ernment corruption on FDI from di¤erent source countries/areas.
From the same Survey of Chinas Private Enterprises, we construct an in-
dicator of the degree of Government Corruption in Chinas di¤erent regions.
It is the proportion of private entrepreneurs answering "Yes" to the question:
is it necessary to have stricter policies against government corruption in your
region?5 Guizhou has the highest degree of government corruption, followed
by Hainan and Jilin, while Shanghai enjoys the lowest degree of government
corruption followed by Hubei and Jiangsu. Like the cross-country corruption
indices such as those constructed by Business International, Transparency In-
ternational or International Country Risk Guide, our cross-region corruption
measure for China is a subjective survey-based index based on entrepreneurs
perceptions of the severity of corruption.
2.2.2 Cultural Distance
The major FDI source countries/areas in this study display large disparities
in cultural proximity with the Chinese mainland. Hong Kong and Taiwan,
the two ethnically Chinese economies, have the closest cultural link with the
mainland. Hong Kong is a former British colony. Between 1853 and 1997, it
had been ruled by Great Britain and has adopted a British-style government
system and legal institutions. Taiwan has been separated from the Chinese
mainland since 1949 when the Nationalist Party retreated there after losing
the civil war to the Communist Party. No matter it was under an autoc-
racy of the Nationalist Party or a democracy since 2000, Taiwan has been a
capitalist society under non-communist ruling. Although they have adopted
completely di¤erent institutions, Hong Kong and Taiwan share the same lan-
guage and culture as the Chinese mainland. Japan and Korea are the two
East Asian powers that are quite close to mainland China in culture. In
history, they had long been inuenced by the Chinese language and culture,
especially the Confusian doctrines. Though the Westernization movement
following the Meji Restoration changed the landscape of the Japanese soci-
ety and culture to a large extent, the Chinese cultural heritage still exists
5Because the question on the degree of government corruption was introduced only after
the 1997 survey, our analysis using the "Government Corruption" index will be restricted
to the subsample of the period 1998-2001.
10
and penetrates deeply into the Japanese society. Currently Korea is closer to
China culturally than does Japan. The Confusian doctrines are still highly
respected and extremely inuential in Korea. In this sense, these two coun-
tries are culturally much closer to China than do most of the other countries.
The US and EU are no doubt most distant from China culturally. Represent-
ing the Western civilization, the US and EU have totally di¤erent languages,
religions and ethics from those of China.
Systematically, we measure the cultural diversity between various source
countries/areas and China on the basis of the inuential Hofstedes cultural
values (Hofstede, 1997). According to this cultural value index, China has a
score of 118, while Hong Kong, Taiwan, US, EU, Japan and Korea have scores
of 96, 87, 25, 33, 80 and 75 respectively. The cultural distance reected in this
index largely testies to our conclusion above. We can systematically mea-
sure the cultural distance between China and each FDI source country/area
by calculating the square of the di¤erence in this cultural index.
2.2.3 Other Variables
While our focus is on the impacts of economic institutions on FDI location
choice made by U.S. multinationals, we also control for a list of other factors
that have been found to be important in the literature. The most impor-
tant one is the agglomeration e¤ect, including both horizontal and vertical
agglomeration.
The growing literature on new economic geography focuses on knowledge
spillover and the improved access to and the sharing of information about
local markets and technology trends as the potential benets of horizontal
agglomeration (Krugman, 1991; Porter, 1998). On the other hand, agglomer-
ation could also generate negative externalities. A rms own knowledge and
technologies can be transferred to rival rms to its disadvantages. Agglom-
eration may also give rise to intensied competition in both product markets
and input markets among adjacently located rms.
The new economic geography theories also highlight the role of backward
and forward linkages, as they promote complementarities and cooperation
among rms of related production stages. The concentration of upstream
rms indicates the accessibility to component suppliers in the region, whereas
the concentration of downstream rms and nal goods consumers shows the
accessibility to markets in the regions (Krugman and Venables, 1995; Ven-
ables, 1996; Duranton and Puga, 2004). Therefore producers typically like
to choose locations that have good access to large markets and to suppliers of
intermediate inputs. It should be pointed out that the horizontal and vertical
11
agglomeration are often bundled together (Fujita, Krugman and Venables,
2001).
Agglomeration
Horizontal agglomeration is measured by the ratio of the number of rms
in the same region and same 4-digit industry to the national total of the
same 4-digit industry. Here we di¤erentiate two types of horizontal agglom-
eration: the agglomeration of multinationals from the same home country as
the rm in question, which is constructed on the basis of the 2001 Survey of
Foreign Invested Enterprises, and the agglomeration of Chinas indigenous
rms based on the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms by Chinas National
Bureau of Statistics.
Agglomeration_FIEirt =
Number_FIEirt
Number_FIEit
Agglomeration_Domesticirt =
Number_Domesticirt
Number_Domesticit
where i represents industry, r denotes region and t indicates year.6
For a given 4-digit industry and a given region, the degree of vertical
agglomeration is measured by the concentration of upstream or downstream
rms in the same region, weighted by the degree of linkages between the in-
dustry and those upstream or downstream industries. Specically the back-
ward (i.e., upstream industries) and forward (i.e., downstream industries)
agglomerations are dened as
Backwardirt = 
j
ij
Number_domesticjrt
Number_domesticjt
Forwardirt = 
j
ij
Number_domesticjrt
Number_domesticjt
+ iC
GDPrt
GDPt
where ij is the input-output ratio reecting the inputs from the upstream
industry j required for one unit of output of industry i; ij is the input-
output ratio showing the input made by industry i required for one unit of
output of downstream industry j; and iC
GDPrt
GDPt
indicates the proportion of
nal demand for industry is output by region r in the total nal demand by
the whole country.7 The data used for constructing the indices for vertical
6Here we follow Head, Ries, and Swenson (1995) in considering the degree of horizontal
agglomeration of both indigenous rms and rms from the same source country.
7Here we employ regional GDP to proxy for market demand and use the ratio of
regional GDP to national GDP to indicate the share of nal demand accounted for by
some particular region.
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agglomeration comes from the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms by Chinas
National Bureau of Statistics and the 1997 Input-Output Table of China.8
Other Regional Characteristics as Control Variables
We follow the literature on FDI location choice to control for the following
factors in regression analysis.
(1)Wages. Low production costs mainly reected in low wages are widely
regarded as an advantage of China in attracting foreign manufacturing rms.
To see how the regional di¤erentiation in wage costs a¤ects FDI distribution,
we include in our analysis the average manufacturing wages in each region.9
(2) Infrastructure. It is widely reported in the literature that regions
with superior transportation facilities are more appealing to FIEs. We use
highway density, i.e., the length of highway per square kilometer in a region,
as an indicator of infrastructure adequacy.
(3) Education. The average human capital level of the workforce could
be an important determinant of FDI location for foreign multinationals, es-
pecially those engaged in technology-intensive industries. We therefore use
the ratio of the number of students enrolled in higher education institutions
in a region to its total population as a proxy for the average level of human
capital in the region.
(4) Government promotion policies. The Chinese central government and
the local governments at various levels set up a large variety of promotion
policies to attract FDI. One important aspect of these promotion policies
is establishing di¤erent types of special development zones. At the national
level, the central government set up four special economic zones and fourteen
open coastal cities in the 1980s. Later, the central government established
various national-level economic and technological development zones in many
cities in various regions. These areas are granted various types of preferen-
tial policies (like preferential tax policy) by the central government and are
allowed to have deals with FIEs exibly. At the same time, the provincial
and the municipal governments have also established numerous provincial- or
local-level economic and technological development zones and o¤ered special
tax incentives to attract FDI. However, it is virtually impossible to have a
clear picture of how many provincial- or local-level development zones and
what kinds of special tax incentives there are in di¤erent regions because there
8Our backward and forward agglomeration indicators are similar in nature to the sup-
plier access and market access measures respectively adopted in Amiti and Javorcki (2007).
In their work, industry output is used to gauge the market access and supplier access, while
we use the number of rms instead because of data limitation. They have also consider
the e¤ect of distance on the impacts of agglomeration economies.
9Data sources for the ve variables are listed in the Appendix A1.
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are no complete statistics from publicly available informational sources. We
thus focus on the national-level zones.
Following Fung, Iizaka and Parker (2002), we adopt two dummy variables.
One (SEZD) takes value one if a region has either special economic zone or
open coastal city, and zero otherwise. The other one (ETDZD) takes value
one if a region has national economic and technological development zone,
and zero otherwise. By including these promotion policies, we are able to
control for the e¤ects of government incentive policies on FDI location choice
and at least partially distinguish between the e¤ects of regional institutional
strength and those of government promotion policies.
3 Estimation Strategy
To investigate the impacts of cultural distance between the FDI source coun-
tries and China on the location choices of FIEs in Chinas various regions,
we pool all FIEs from all FDI source countries/areas together.
We employ the discrete choice model developed by McFadden (1974) to
analyze how cultural distance shapes the responses of di¤erent FDI source
countries/areas to the variation in local institutions. The basic premise of
the discrete choice model is that the location chosen by an FIE must o¤er
the highest prot over all other possible regions. Let ijt be the prot that
rm i derives from setting up a manufacturing operation in region j at time
t. As discussed earlier, ijt is determined by regional economic institutions,
Ijt 1; a host of region js other characteristics including agglomeration etc.
at time t  1, Xjt 1, and the cultural distance between the home country h
of rm i and China (c), Dhc. "ijt is a disturbance term:
ijt =  + Ijt 1 +  Xjt 1 + Ijt 1 Dhct 1 + "ijt
The probability of rm i locating in region j is given by:
Pi(j) = Pr obfijt  iktg for all k 6= j
= Pr obf + Ijt 1 +  Xjt 1 + Ijt 1 Dhct 1 + "ijt
 ( + Ikt 1 +  Xkt 1 + Ikt 1 Dhct 1 + "ikt)g for all k 6= j
= Pr ob

"ijt   "ikt  (Ijt 1   Ikt 1)
+  (Xjt 1  Xkt 1) + (Ijt 1   Ikt 1) Dhct 1

for all k 6= j
McFadden (1974) shows that, if and only if "ijt follows Type I extreme
distribution, Pi(j) can be further simplied to the following logit expression:
Pi(j) =
eIjt 1+Xjt 1+Ijt 1Dhct 1P
k2K e
Ikt 1+Xkt 1+Ikt 1Dhct 1
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where K is the set of location choices faced by rm i. And it can then be
estimated by the conditional logit method, which has been used extensively in
the FDI location literature (e.g., Coughlin, Terza and Arromdee, 1991; Head,
Ries and Swenson, 1995). The conditional logit method estimates how each
regional characteristic increases or decreases the chances that a region will
be chosen rather than all other potential regions available for choice.
We analyze the importance of not only the four economic institution vari-
ables  Intellectual Property Rights Protection, Government Intervention in
Business Operations, Government Corruption, and Contract Enforcement -
but also their interaction with the cultural distance measure, after including
all the other variables as control variables. The determination of the proba-
bility of choosing region j can be derived in a similar way as stated above. We
expect that the estimated coe¢ cient of the interaction term Ijt 1Dhct 1 will
be statistically signicant and will suggest that Chinas regional economic in-
stitutions play a more important role in shaping FDI location choice for FDI
coming from countries/areas that are culturally more remote from China.
Next, we conduct this regression analysis for the subsamples of FOEs and
JVs separately. Similarly, we expect that this interaction term will exhibit
more statistically signicant and/or larger-magnitude estimated coe¢ cients
for FOEs than for JVs.
4 Results
4.1 Cultural Distances and FDI Location Choice
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the key variables in this study.
Table 2 presents results on how cultural distance between the FDI source
country and the Chinese mainland shapes the patterns of responses of FIEs to
regional economic institutions. We do not nd contract enforcement to have
appreciable impacts on FDI location choice, and the cultural distance does
not signicantly a¤ect the sensitivity of FIEs toward regional institutions ei-
ther. However, we do nd that regional government intervention in business
stimulates FDI entry, but its e¤ect is diminished for FIEs from source coun-
tries/areas that are culturally farther away from the Chinese mainland. This
suggests that FIEs from source countries/areas closer to mainland China
could e¤ectively take advantage of government intervention to turn it into a
government helping hand, whereas FIEs from source countries/areas farther
away from China are less able to do so.
Similarly, the enhancing e¤ect of regional IPR protection on FDI entry
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clearly exists, and it is more remarkable for FIEs stemming from the source
countries/areas that are more culturally remote from China. Hence, FIEs
from culturally remote sources have deeper concerns with the property rights
protection in the investing region.
Finally, a higher degree of corruption truly deters FDI entry, but surpris-
ingly and puzzlingly the interplay of cultural distance and regional corruption
turns out unexpected positive sign.
We nd that all the four control variables of agglomeration economies gen-
erate positive and statistically signicant impacts on the FDI location choice
of multinationals from the six major source countries/areas. This suggests
that foreign multinationals tend to choose those regions where there are con-
centration of other FIEs engaged in the same industry from the same home
country, clustering of Chinas indigenous rms of the same industry, and
wide market and supplier access. Results in Table 2 suggest that the pos-
itive impact of agglomeration of home country FIEs is larger than that of
Chinas indigenous rms: if the agglomeration of Chinas indigenous rms
increases 1%, it raises the probability of investment of foreign multinationals
by 1.98%, while a 1% rise in the agglomeration of home country multination-
als boosts the chances of investment of multinationals by 3.68%.10 This is
reasonable because the clustering of home country FIEs could help dissemi-
nate information, share experience and thus enhance the adaptability of new
FIEs to the new regional business environment. Interestingly, the e¤ects of
forward agglomeration (market access) are much larger than those of back-
ward agglomeration (supplier access) on the location choice of FIEs. It can
be calculated that a 1% increment in the ratio of the forward agglomeration
indicator will push up the chances of investment of foreign multinationals by
6.51%, whereas the same increment in the backward agglomeration indica-
tor will raise the probability by 3.53%. This suggests that market access is
extremely more important in attracting FIEs than supplier access does.11
The other control variables for regional characteristics mostly exhibit re-
sults consistent with both theoretical predictions and existing ndings in the
literature. Highway density in a region consistently promotes FDI entry,
suggesting that basic infrastructure is one essential factor in luring FDI. Hu-
man capital endowment reected in higher education enrollment also in most
cases boosts FDI. Our results are largely consistent with the ndings of Fung,
Iizaka and Parker (2002) and Gao (2005) that regional labor quality signif-
icantly a¤ects regional aggregate FDI ows from developed countries. The
10The e¤ects of agglomeration are calculated based on the average of the estimated
coe¢ cients of the relevant explanatory variable in regressions of Table 2.
11Amiti and Javorcik (2007) nd that the supplier access and market access have sinilar
impacts on the changes of FDI ows of Chinas regions.
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national government promotion policies consistently produce the expected
positive and signicant impact on FDI entry. The most puzzling result is
concerned with the regional average wage. It turns out to be positive and
signicant. This is likely the case that regions with higher wages have a
larger proportion of skilled labor, and higher average wages reect the skill
premium. This result implies that FDI often ows to regions with more
skilled labor.
4.2 Cultural Distance and the Location Choice of JVs
and FOEs
In Table 3, we explore how cultural distance between the FDI source coun-
try/area and the Chinese mainland shapes the sensitivity of locational choices
of JVs and FOEs to the variation in regional institutions. Regional contract
enforcement index has signicantly positive impacts only on the location
choice of FOEs but it has negative e¤ects on JVs. This shows that FOEs
care much more about contract enforcement than do JVs. Nonetheless, the
contract enforcement index exerts stronger positive impacts on JVs when
cultural diversity is larger, whereas the index has more negative impacts on
FOEs when cultural diversity is more striking. This suggests that cultural
diversity reduces the impact of contract enforcement on FOE entry but en-
hances that of JV entry, which is inconsistent with our expectations.
Government intervention in business operations have signicant and pos-
itive e¤ects on FOE and JV entry, but this e¤ect is reduced for both entry
modes when the cultural distance is larger. The magnitude of the estimated
coe¢ cient of the interaction term between government intervention and cul-
tural distance is slightly larger for FOEs than for JVs. This is consistent with
our expectation that FOEs are more likely to regard government intervention
as a grabbing hand.
IPR protection has positive e¤ects on both JVs and FOEs. The impact
of IPR protection on the locational choice of both JVs and FOEs is stronger
when the cultural distance is larger, but the magnitude of the e¤ect shows
no di¤erence between JVs and FOEs.
Government corruption deters the entry of both FOEs and JVs. Nonethe-
less, surprisingly and puzzlingly, the negative e¤ects of regional corruption
on the locational choice of both JVs and FOEs shrink when the cultural
distance is larger.
This puzzling result along with the similar one in Table 2 could be the
consequence of the increasing practice of bribery behavior adopted by many
large MNEs around the late 1990s. It is reported that more and more large
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MNEs, which typically come from US, EU, Japan etc., realize that they have
to bribe government o¢ cials in various ways to gain access to the Chinese
market. They often provide large amounts of funds to support the children
of local bureaucratsto study abroad; they often promise to o¤er local bu-
reaucrats a high-paid position in the company once the o¢ cials retire from
their government posts (He, 2005). In this way, FIEs from culturally remote
countries become less susceptible to local government corruption.
Turn to the control variables. The agglomeration of home country multi-
nationals has an appreciably larger promoting e¤ect on the entry of FOEs
than on that of JVs. At the same time, clustering of Chinese indigenous rms
has a much larger stimulative e¤ect on the entry of JVs than on that of FOEs.
This suggests that when foreign multinationals build a fully-owned subsidiary
in the Chinese mainland, the agglomeration of home country multinationals
could provide a useful network for sharing experience and enhancing collec-
tive bargaining power with local bureaucrats and businesses; however, when
FDI adopts JVs, the importance of home country multinationals diminishes,
and that of the clustering of Chinese indigenous rms of the same indus-
try increases because the Chinese partners in the JVs can make good use
of the connections with Chinese industry partners. Backward agglomeration
plays a much larger role in attracting JVs than FOEs, while there is no clear
di¤erence in the e¤ect of forward agglomeration on JVs and FOEs.
Highway density consistently produces positive and signicant e¤ects on
FDI entry, and the magnitude of the e¤ect is larger for FOEs than for JVs.
This indicates that FOEs prefer regions with better infrastructure more than
JVs do. The e¤ect of human capital endowment is not consistent, sometimes
positive and sometimes negative. Government promotion policies reected
in development zones do produce consistently positive e¤ects on the entry
of both JVs and FOEs. The e¤ects are typically larger for FOEs than for
JVs, which suggests that government promotion policies are more appealing
to FOEs than to JVs. The average wage rate has positive and statistically
signicant e¤ects on the entry of FOEs, whereas its e¤ect is insignicant for
JVs. This is probably because FOEs often are more likely than JVs to possess
proprietary technology that requires a large number of skilled workers.
5 Conclusion
Foreign direct investment by multinationals of developed countries/areas has
been shown to be important for transition economies as well as develop-
ing economies, for it brings capital, advanced technologies and management
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know-how. This is especially the case in China, as its transition from a cen-
trally planned economy to a market economy has been driven by its open-
door policy (i.e., opening to foreign trade and investment) since 1978. Indeed,
many of these developing countries or transition economies have been trying
to attract foreign direct investment, mostly through tax incentives.
This paper, however, focuses on how the interplay of economic institutions
and cultural distance a¤ects FDI entry. Using a data set covering FIEs from
six major FDI source countries/areas in various regions in China for the
period 1993-2001, we nd that FIEs from the source countries/areas that
are culturally more remote from China often exhibit a stronger aversion to
regions with weaker economic institutions. Moreover, this pattern is slightly
more salient when FDI takes the form of fully-owned enterprises (FOEs) than
when it takes the form of joint ventures (JVs).
This study is the rst attempt that sysmatically investigates how the in-
terplay of regional institutions and the cultural distance between the host
country and the home country/area gives rise to di¤erent patterns of sen-
sitivity of FDI toward regional economic institutions. Moreover, compared
with some cross-country studies of the impacts of economic institutions on
FDI, our study avoids the problem of controlling for the di¤erences in polit-
ical system, culture and language, corporate tax policies, and national trade
and investment policies across countries.
Our study generates policy implications for the governments in transition
and developing economies as FDI recipients on the importance of strength-
ening economic institutions in attracting FDI. Since East Asian economies
such as Japan, Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan are the largest FDI sources for
the Chinese mainland, our comparative analysis of FDI from di¤erent ma-
jor source countries/areas will help East Asian governments and East Asian
MNEs understand better the importance of institutions versus other factors
in shaping the location choice patterns of FIEs in China. Both governments
and MNEs in East Asian FDI source economies can urge the Chinese gov-
ernments at the national and regional levels to improve their institutional in-
frastructure and thus investment environment. At the same time, given that
institutional structure might take quite some time to improve, East Asian
governments and MNEs can take advantage of their cultural proximity to the
Chinese mainland to overcome institutional barriers and outperform their
counterparts in North America and Europe in exploring the vast Chinese
market. This competitive edge for the East Asian source economies should
be of great signicance because the Chinese economy is growing rapidly and
o¤ers numerous business opportunities to FIEs.
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Table 1 Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Economic Institutions  
Contract enforcement 0.1151 0.0868 0.0222 0.5
Regional IPR protection -1.2588 0.9009 -2.9051 1.6527
Government intervention in business 0.0431 0.0493 0 0.4239
Regional corruption 0.4617 0.1397 0.1905 0.8788
Agglomeration  
Agglomeration_home 0.0338 0.0943 0 1
Agglomeration_domestic 0.0341 0.0527 0 1
Backward agglomeration 0.0191 0.0211 0.0001 0.2713
Forward agglomeration 0.0263 0.0253 0.0000 0.3641
Other Controlled Variables 
Wages 8.3951 0.4319 7.6811 9.7518
Highway density -1.6074 0.8435 -4.1585 -0.2120
Education 0.9561 0.6570 -0.2231 3.1355
Sezd 0.3754 0.4842 0 1
Etdzd 0.5153 0.4998 0 1
Table 2 Institutions, Cultural Distance and FDI Location Choice 
  1 2 3 4  
Agglomeration      
Agglomeration_home 3.82*** 3.81*** 3.81*** 3.82***  
  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03   
Agglomeration_domestic 2.07*** 2.07*** 2.02*** 2.06***  
  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07   
Backward agglomeration 3.70*** 3.68*** 3.28*** 3.47***  
  0.27  0.27  0.27  0.27   
Forward agglomeration 6.93*** 6.96*** 6.10*** 6.97***  
  0.25  0.25  0.26  0.25   
Institution Environment      
Contract enforcement -0.14     
  0.16      
Contract enforcement * 0.00      
 Cultural distance 0.00      
Government intervention in 
business  1.46***    
   0.24     
Government intervention in 
business  -0.0005***    
 * Cultural distance  0.00     
Regional IPR protection   0.17***   
    0.01    
Regional IPR protection   0.0000***   
 * Cultural distance   0.00    
Regional corruption    -0.74***  
     0.06   
Regional corruption*Cultural 
distance    0.0001***  
     0.00   
Controlled Variables      
Wages 0.19*** 0.17*** 0.12*** 0.11***  
  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03   
Highway density 0.61*** 0.61*** 0.52*** 0.61***  
  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02   
Education 0.04*** 0.05*** -0.13*** 0.07***  
  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01   
Sezd 0.55*** 0.56*** 0.54*** 0.57***  
  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02   
Etdzd 0.43*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.43***  
  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02   
No. of Choosers 56,896 56,896 56,896 56,896  
No. of Choices 29 29 29 29  
Pseudo R2 0.2943 0.2945 0.2953 0.2946  
LR chi2(10) 112676.61 112753.00 113078.58 112806.77   
Standard Errors are reported in the parentheses   
Superscripts *,**,*** indicate the statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 3 Institutions, Cultural Distance and the Location Choice of Fully-owned Enterprises and Joint Ventures 
 
  1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 
  JV OE JV OE JV OE JV OE F F F F
Agglomeration         
Agglomeration_home 3.34*** 4.57*** 3.33*** 4.56*** 3.33*** 4.57*** 3.34*** 4.60*** 
  0.03  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.03  0.04  
Agglomeration_domestic 2.64*** 0.99*** 2.66*** 0.99*** 2.59*** 0.97*** 2.64*** 0.96*** 
  0.09  0.12  0.09  0.12  0.09  0.12  0.09  0.12  
Backward agglomeration 5.52*** 1.11** 5.53*** 1.01** 5.20*** 0.63  5.54*** 0.28  
  0.34  0.47  0.34  0.47  0.34  0.47  0.34  0.47  
Forward agglomeration 6.48*** 6.59*** 6.52*** 6.55*** 5.64*** 6.19*** 6.52*** 6.71*** 
  0.31  0.42  0.31  0.42  0.32  0.43  0.31  0.42  
Institution Environment         
Contract enforcement -1.08*** 0.88***       
  0.20  0.27        
Contract enforcement *Cultural 
distance 0.0002*** -0.0001***       
  0.00  0.00        
Government intervention in 
business   2.34*** 1.20***     
    0.27  0.41      
Government intervention in 
business *Culture Distance   -0.0006*** -0.0007***     
    0.00  0.00      
Regional IPR protection     0.19*** 0.03   
      0.02 0.02   
Regional IPR protection * Cultural 
distance     0.0000*** 0.0000****   
      0.00  0.00    
Regional corruption       -0.50*** -1.38*** 
        0.08  0.11  
Regional corruption*Cultural 
distance       0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
        0.00  0.00  
Controlled Variables         
Wages 0.06  0.56*** 0.03  0.55*** 0.01  0.50*** 0.03  0.38*** 
  0.04  0.05  0.04  0.05  0.04  0.05  0.04  0.05  
Highway density 0.52*** 0.69*** 0.55*** 0.68*** 0.45*** 0.62*** 0.54*** 0.73*** 
  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.03  
Education 0.11*** -0.09*** 0.12*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.18**** 0.18*** -0.04** 
  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02  
Sezd 0.45*** 0.76*** 0.45*** 0.78*** 0.42*** 0.80*** 0.45*** 0.81*** 
  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.03  
Etdzd 0.35*** 0.69*** 0.33*** 0.68*** 0.38*** 0.68*** 0.38*** 0.70*** 
  0.02  0.04  0.02  0.04  0.02  0.04  0.02  0.04  
No. of Choosers  36,582  21,631 36,582  21,631 36,582 21,631  36,582   21,631 
No. of Choices 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Pseudo R2 0.2485 0.3859 0.2487 0.3861 0.2495 0.3870 0.2486 0.3871 
LR chi2(10) 59564.04 55286.74 59613.27 55310.12 59785.47 55439.98 59585.37 55460.24 
Standard errors are reported in the parentheses.      
Superscripts *,**,*** indicate the statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively.   
 
